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1. Introduction
In a lot of literature roles that strategic methods such as research and development (R&D) investment,
capacity, and advertising play have been considered, and the interesting result that an overinvestment (or
underinvestment) is made in R&D in the nonsimultaneous decisions of output (or price) and such a strategic
method had been derived by several papers.
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992) use strategic two−stage game models with R&
D investment and compare the R&D investments and outputs under several organizational modes based on such
models. Kamien et al. especially extend the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin model to a more general model with
product differentiation and n ( 2) firms. They take four modes, say R&D competition, R&D cartelization, RJV
competition, and RJV cartelization, with respect to R&D investment decision, where RJV abbreviates research
joint venture, and rank among strategic R&D investments and prices (outputs) under them in the Cournot
quantity−setting model1. Moreover, they perform the classification only as to R&D investment in a Bertrand
price−setting model, however they do not make a comparison between R&D investments and prices in the
Cournot quantity−setting and Bertrand price−setting models at all. Our main purpose is to classify the strategic
R&D investments in each of both models and then to compare reciprocally the R&D investments and the prices
(outputs) in the models. When firms perform strategic R&D activities, and their spillovers arise, we address the
validity of the conventional outcome that prices (outputs) are lower (larger) in Bertrand−price competition than
in Cournot−quantity one.
Our analysis is distinguished from those of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992) by
the following points. First, their discussions are all or for the most part spent to investigate classifications as to R
&D investment and price in Cournot−quantity competition. But we assign our discussion equally to
investigation of such classifications in both Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price competitions. Second, our
discussion is extended to the case in which outputs are complements (substitutes) in Cournot−quantity
(Bertrand−price) competition.
1 Kamien et al. (1992) make reference to an RJV in detail.
Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Cournot and
Bertrand Duopolies with Spillovers, and Their Comparison
《論 説》
岡山大学経済学会雑誌３４（３），２００２，１～１８
－１－
Secondly, we compare the strategic R&D investments and the prices (outputs) in a quantity−setting model
with those in a price−setting model. Then the relationship among firms’ R&D behavior, and demand and
competition characteristics is considered. Although the expenditure of R&D in both R&D competition and R&D
cartelization is larger in Cournot−quantity competition than in Bertrand−price competition, the conventional
result that output (price) is lower (higher) in the former competition than in the latter competition carries over to
the case with strategic R&D investment and its spillover effect. It, therefore, follows that welfare is greater in
Bertrand−price competition than in Cournot−quantity competition. These results show that commitment by R&
D and the spillover effect do not have a strong influence to such an extent that they overthrow the conventional
result. Consumer’s surplus is maximized (minimized) in the case of RJV cartelization (R&D competition) in
Bertrand−price (Cournot−quantity) competition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we rank each of the R&D investments and the prices (outputs)
obtained under several behavioral modes as to R&D choice in Cournot−quantity competition, as in both Kamien
et al. (1992) and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). In Section 3 the same classification as in the previous
section is made by replacing Cournot−quantity competition with Bertrand−price competition. This is the
counterpart of the analysis in Section 2. Section 4 compares the R&D investments and the prices (outputs) in the
quantity−setting model with those in the price−setting model. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Cournot−quantity competition
Consider a duopoly of firms 1 and 2 producing differentiated goods qi , i  1 2. Their inverse demand functions
take the form of
p1  a bq1dq2
(1)
p2  a dq1bq2,
where pi stands for the price of good i , and the parameters are a 0 and b 0. The goods are substitutes,
independent, or complements according as d is positive, zero, or negative. We assume b d and d 0 or
d 0. Since the case with d  0 corresponds to monopoly, we exclude it.
Firm i produces its output with both constant marginal cost, c 0, and zero fixed cost, and also invests in R
&D to reduce its own per−unit costs prior to its output choice. If it intends to lower the per−unit costs by xi ,
then it must spend c I(xi ) as R&D expenditure. Now expenditure function c I(xi ) of R&D investment is assumed
to be a convex function of xi , dc I (xi )dx i  c I(xi )0, c I(xi )0, and c I(0) 0: namely, the rate of returns
to R&D investment is diminishing.
We suppose that there are spillovers between the firms in the industry concerning the outcome of investment,
because it will be impossible for each firm to perfectly appropriate its own technology and skills for cost
reduction acquired through its R&D activities even if it takes out patents for them2. No small amount of them
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will be involuntarily transferred to their rival3. Thus, if firm j succeeds in reducing marginal cost by xj , then its
transfer enables the rival to lower its marginal cost by  x j , i  j , where  , 0 1, refers to the spillover
rate of the latter, i.e., “the free−rider effect” (Kamien et al., 1992). For example,   0 implies that firm j
perfectly appropriates the outcome of R&D investment, while   1 corresponds to either the case in which a
research joint venture (RJV) between the firms is formed so as to internalize the spillover effects or the case in
which all of the outcome perfectly flows out from each firm. The formation of the RJV has two advantages to its
participants: one is that they can share mutually their information about R&D activities, and the second is that
they can eliminate the duplication of their R&D activities (internalization of the externality, so called) (Kamien
et al.)4. Except for the RJV formation, an example with   1 is the development of financial and insurance
commodities. With respect to these commodities, not only a financial institution (e.g. one insurance company),
which developed them, but also other institutions (insurance companies) have been allowed to freely sell them
to customers. Firm i ’s marginal cost is thus reduced by xi  x j in all if it and its rival can reduce their
marginal costs as a result of R&D investments, xi and xj , respectively. It is assumed that c xi  x j ,
ij  12, i  j .
We use a two−stage game model like d’Aspremont and Jacuqemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992), in which
each of the firms determines its investment level in the first stage and then chooses its output in the second
stage, given (x1x2). In the second stage each firm chooses output so as to maximize its production profits net of
its first−stage R&D expenditures:i   pi (c xi  x j )  qi c I(xi ) (pi Ai )qi c I(xi ), i  j (2)
where Ai  c xi  x j 05. For the following discussion it is assumed that a Ai . Then the first−order
conditions for maximization are given by6iq i  a Ai 2 bq i dq j  0, i  j． (3)
Note that the reaction curves in ouptut space slope downwardly (upwardly) when d is positive (negative), so
that outputs are substitutes (complements) as d () 0. Solving these equations, we obtain Cournot−Nash
equilibrium outputs (q1
cq2c) such as
2 Goto and Nagata (1997) conclude that spillovers of technology are fairly high in Japanese companies because their appropriability is
low.
3 According to Goto and Nagata (1997), main resources for firms to acquire information on the R&D and innovation activities of a
rival are due to patents, publications, and informal conversations in Japan and the U. S.
4 As another advantage of its formation, it is asserted that economies of scale concerning R&D investment are yielded.
5 Our treatment of R&D investment is the same as d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), but a little different from that of Kamien et al.
(1992).
6 The second−order conditions are satisfied, and the second−stage equilibrium is locally stable.
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qi
C  2b (a Ai )d (a Aj )
4b 2d 2 , i  j , (4)
where superscript C denotes output in the Cournot−quantity competition. The effects of xi and xj on output are
derived as follows: q iC x i  2b d4b 2d 2 0 for anyand d q iC x j  2bd4b 2d 2 0 as   d2b for d 0, and  q iC x j 0 for d 0, i  j .
Let us turn to the decision of R&D investment in the first stage. Differentiating (2) with respect to xi and
using (3), we have the first−order conditions with respect to R&D: i x i   i q jC q jc x i qicc I(xi ) 0, i  j , (5)
where  i  q jc  dq ic () 0 for d () 0. From (5) we obtain the Cournot−Nash equilibrium R&D
investments, (x1
CNCx2CNC), where NC of superscript CNC denotes variables in R&D competition7. Firm i’s R&D
reaction curve is upward−sloping. For the following discussion it is required that the game has a subgame−
perfect Cournot−Nash equilibrium, (x1
CNCx2CNC)(q1CNCq2CNC)  where qiCNC qi (x1CNCx2CNC), i  12, and is
also assumed that the first−stage equilibrium is locally stable.
It has been assumed in the above discussion that each firm noncooperatively determines R&D investment. We
next consider the case in which both firms cooperatively behave in the R&D decision, namely, form an R&D
cartel, and choose the levels of R&D investments so as to maximize the sum of combined profits, maintaining
quantity competition in the product markets. In the first stage of R&D choice each firm internalizes its rival’s
behavior like the case of a merger by forming an R&D cartel, while in the second stage of quantity choice they
keep competition. It is assumed for the time being that each firm attempts to appropriate performances acquired
by R&D investment without exchanging them with each other. The maximization problem of firm i joining in
the R&D cartel is expressed as
max
xi
 i j , i  j .
Then the first−order condition for firm i is given by8
7 The second−order conditions require that 2i xi2  (2b d)24b 2d 2 2c I(xi )0.
8 It is assumed that the second−order conditions are satisfied.
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  x i   i x i 2b (2bd )qjC4b 2d 2  0, i  j． (6)
The second term on the right−hand side of this condition is the combined profit externality given by firm i ’s R
&D investment on the profit of the rival. Whether or not this externality is positive depends on the magnitude ofand d . Incidentally, the optimal conditions in the second stage do not change as quantity competition is kept.
Since preparations for comparison have completed, we compare R&D investments in such two modes as R&
D cartelization (cooperation) (Case CC), and R&D competition (Case CNC), where first symbol C of each case
stands for Cournot competition, and NC and C after its C stand for R&D competition and its cartelization,
respectively. Let us introduce a research joint venture (RJV). RJV competition (case NJ) and RJV cartelization
(case CJ) of Kamien et al. (1992) correspond to our cases CNC with 1 (say case CNCJ) and CC with it (say
case CCJ), respectively, where RJV stands for research joint venture. Then we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (a) Suppose that outputs are substitutes, i.e. d 0. Then the equilibrium R&D investments, x k,
k CNCCNCJCC and CCJ, satisfy
xCNCxCC if 0d2b ; xCNCxCC if d2b 1 (equity if d2b );
and xCNCxCNCJ if 2bd 21; and xCCxCCJ9.
(b) Suppose that outputs are complements, i.e. d < 0. Then the equilibrium R&D investments x k also satisfy
xCNCxCC; xCNCxCNCJ and xCCxCCJ.
Proof. First, consider the case with d 0. Since  j  x i is negative, zero, or positive according as
0d2b ,  d2b , or d2b 1,   x i is less than, equal to, or larger than  i  x i ,
respectively. Combining these results and (6), we obtain that xCNCxCC if 0d2b and xCNCxCC if
d2b 1 (equity holding if d2b ).
The first−order conditions for both R&D and RJV competitions are given from (5) as follows, respectively:
a c (1)x  (4b 22bd)
(2b d )(4b 2d 2)  c I(x ) (5)′
a c 2x( )(4b 22bd )
(2b d )(4b 2d 2)  c I(x ) (5)′
9 When expenditure function c I(x )is more (less) convex, the amount of R&D investemnt is larger (smaller) in RJV competition than in
R&D competition, i.e. xCNC() xCNCJ.
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Making a comparison of the left−hand sides of both equations yields
a  c (1 )x  (4b 2 2bd )
(2b d )(4b 2 d 2)  a  c 2x( )(4b 2 2bd )(2b d )(4b 2 d 2) if 2bd  2 1.
Then we obtain xCNCxCNCJ whenever 2bd  2 1. Otherwise, this may or may not hold. Similarly,
the first−order conditons for R&D and RJV cartelizations are also given from (6) as follows, respectively:
2b (1 ) a  c (1 )x  
2b d c I(x ) (6)′
4b (a  c )8bx
2b d c I(x ) (6)′
As the left−hand side of (6)′is always larger than that of (6)′, xCCxCCJ holds.
Second, consider the case with d 0. The second term on the right−hand side of (6), j x i , is positive,
irrespective of , so that xCNCxCC holds. Compare the investments in R&D and RJV competitions. Then we
obtain xCNCxCNCJ since the left−hand side of (6)′is smaller than that of (6)′for any . Meanwhile, as for the
comparison of the investment levels under R&D and RJV cartelizations the same result as in the case with
d 0 is obtained.
Given d 0, the result concerning RJV competition is unambiguously different from the result of Kamien et
al. (1992) that the amount of R&D investment is always larger in R&D competition than in RJV competition.
However, as shown in the proposition, whether R&D investment in R&D competition exceeds that in RJV
competition depends on a spillover rate. The intuitive explanation for this is given as follows. Given 2bd  2, the marginal profitability (revenue) of R&D investment decreases as spillover increases, and its
curve goes down to the lowest level in the case of RJV competition. This is because each firm free rides on its
rival’s R&D investment. Hence R&D investment is minimized in the RJV cartel. On the other hand, given 2bd  2, the comparison of investments under CNC and CNCJ is impossible, because the marginal
profitability curve is not much shifted upwardly by an increase in the spillover rate as the free−rider effect is not
great. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the marginal profitability curves of R&D investment in R&D
and RJV competitions when d is positive. In short, the difference between our and Kamien et al.’s results seems
to result in a difference between the assumptions concerning the R&D production functions (or the R&D
expenditure functions). Note that the product differentiation between goods 1 and 2 has a strong effect on the
relationship between R&D investments in R&D competition and RJV competition. Namely, 49d 2b 2 1
must hold in order for b and d to satisfy both 2bd  2 1 and b d . For example, if b d , then R&
D investment is larger in R&D competition than in RJV competition for any spillover rate, but if b 15d , then
this holds if and only if 1. These imply that the range of spillover for which R&D investment is larger in R
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&D competition than in RJV competition reduces as product differentiation makes progress: there is no
spillover such that xCNC xCNCJ as long as 0 d 2b 2  49≒ 0444. Furthermore, when we make a
comparison between the R&D investments under d 0 and d  0, its level is reduced to be less in the former
than in the latter in the two cases of R&D and RJV competitions.
Given d 0, the result concerning the comparison of the R&D investments under both R&D and RJV
cartelizations is the same as Kamien et al. As spillover rises, costs are curtailed and outputs increase, so that the
marginal profitability curve is shifted upwardly. In particular, the amount of R&D investment is maximized in
the RJV cartel. This is because the free−rider effect is eliminated in the R&D cartel in that its participants
coordinate their R&D investments, as explained by Kamien et al. In the case with d  0, the same result is
obtained. We note that both R&D investments under R&D and RJV cartelizations are larger in the case with
d  0 than in the case with d 0, respectively, as the outputs are complements in the former case.
Let us turn to the comparisons of the equilibrium prices in the four models. Then the corollary to Proposition
1 is derived as follows.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium prices, p k, kCNCCNCJCC, and CCJ, satisfy the following classifications:
(a) given d 0, pCNC pCC if 0 d2b , and pCNC pCC if d2b 1 (equity if d2b ), and
pCNCpCNCJ if 2bd 21, and pCC pCCJ ; and (b) given d  0, pCNCpCC, pCNC pCNCJ, and
pCC pCCJ.
Proof. Outputs are an increasing function of R&D investment. Consider the case with d 0. From Proposition
1 we immediately get qCNCqCC if 0 d2b , and qCNCqCC if d2b 1 (equity if d2b ).
We also get both qCNC qCNCJ if 2bd 21 and qCCqCCJ from the comparison of the outputs under
CNC and CNCJ, and CC and CCJ. In the case with d  0, it follows from Proposition 1 that qCNC qCC,
qCNCqCNCJ, and qCCqCCJ. Now the following relationship about output and price is derived from the
inverse demand functions:
d2b 2  d2b 2
Figure 1 Marginal Profitability Curves in the Cases with d >０
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pi
X piXXbi (qiXX qiX)d (qjXX qjX), i j ,
where X and XX denote CC and CNC. By the assumption that the firms are symmetric, the classifications on the
pirces are the reverse of those on the outputs.
Conventionally, it is well known that less output and high price are lead by the formation of an output cartel
whenever outputs are substitutes and there is no spillover. Even if firms form an R&D investment cartel instead
of the output cartel, the similar conclusion to the conventional one is derived as long as spillover is small.
However, when spillover is large, this is not the case. The reason why the different result from the conventional
one is derived is due to the positive externality. Specifically, when the spillover effect is large, firms in the R&D
cartel intend to invest in (produce) more R&D (output) than in R&D competition since the R&D expenditure of
one firm leads to an increase in the combined profits.
3. The Bertrand−price competition
There is the duality structure between the demand functions in quantity−setting models and in price−setting
models (Sonnenschein, 1968). So when applying this duality to (1), we have
q1   p 1p 2
(1)′
q2  p 1 p 2,
where (ab  bd )(b 2 d 2)0,b(b 2 d 2)0, andd(b 2 d 2). It is assumed that pi Ai ,
i 12.
In the strategic two−stage game each firm chooses its level of R&D investment in the first stage and then its
price in the second stage. The first−order conditions for maximization in the second stage are obtained by
differentiating (2) with respect to pi and using (1)′:ip i  Ai  2p i p j 0, i j	 (7)
This shows that the reaction curve of each firm slopes upwardly (downwardly) in price space when d (
) 0.
Bertrand competition with complements is the dual of Cournot competition with substitutes. From (7) Bertrand−
Nash equilibrium prices in the second stage are lead as
pi
B 2( A i )( A j )
42 2 , i j (8)
where superscript B stands for variables in Bertrand−price competition of the second stage. Then the effects of
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xi and xj on prices are also lead as piB x i  b (2b d)4b 2d 2 0 and  piB x j  b (2bd )4b 2d 2 0, i  j . (9)
Incidentally, the output corresponding to price pi
B is given as
qi
B  b (2b 2d 2)(a Ai )bd (a Aj )  
(4b 2d 2)(b 2d 2) , i  j
In the first stage the first−order condition for firm i is given by i xi   i pjB pjB xi qiBc I(xi ) 0, (10)
where  i pjB  (piBAi ) d (piBAi )(b 2d 2)0 . The second−order condition requires 2i xi2 010. When the game has a subgame−perfect Bertrand−Nash equilibrium, (x1BNC	x2BNC)  ,
(p1
BNC	p2BNC), where piBNC pi (x1BNC	x2BNC), i  1	2, there are the strategic equilibrium R&D investments,
(x1
BNC	x2BNC), where NC of superscript BNC denotes variables in R&D competition of the first stage. The first
term on the right−hand side of (10) is the strategic term. As mentioned in the previous section, firms involving R
&D competition strive to appropriate the outcome of R&D investment except for the formation of an RJV.
Consider R&D investment under R&D cartelization (cooperation). The two firms form an R&D cartel and
determine R&D investments so as to maximize the sum of combined profits,  i j , i  j , but
noncooperatively determining prices in the second stage. Then the first−order condition for firm i in the R&D
cartel is11  xi   i xi 2 (2b 2d 2)bd  qjB4b 2d 2  0, i  j (11)
When the R&D investments satisfy this equation, the strategic R&D cartel equilibrium, (x1
BC	x2BC), is given. The
second term,  j xi , i  j , of (11) is the externality that R&D investment of firm i confers its rival’ profits,
but this is internalized for the former by maximizing the combined profits.
When  1, R&D competition and R&D cartelization are converted to RJV competition (BNCJ) and RJV
cartelization (BCJ), as in Kamien et. al (1992). Compare the R&D investments in both R&D competition, R&D
cartelization, RJV competition, and RJV cartelization. As the counterpart of Proposition 1 the following
10 The reaction curves in R&D investment space have a positive slope. The stability condition in the first stage is 2i xi2   2i xj xi , i  j . As  2i xi2 0 and  2i xj xi 0, the condition is finally reduced to
(1)(2b 2bdd 2)(2b d )(b d )c I(xi ). If c I(xi ) 0, then it is not explicitly satisfied. For the equilibrium to be
stable, c I(xi ) must be at least negative.
11 The second−order conditions are assumed to be satisfied.
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proposition is established.
Proposition 2. (a) Suppose that outputs are complements, i.e. d  0. Then the equilibrium R&D investments,
x k , k BNCBNCJBC , and BCJ, satisfy
xBNC xBC if 0bd(2b 2d 2); xBNCxBC if bd(2b 2d 2)1 (equity holding if bd(2b 2d 2)) ; xBNCxBNCJ if (2b 2d 2)bd 21; and xBCxBCJ12.
(b) Suppose that outputs are subsitutes, i.e. d < 0. Then those R&D invetments satisfy
xBNCxBC; xBNCxBNCJ and xBCxBCJ.
Proof. First, let us take the case with d  0. When combining (10) and (11), we obtain that xBNC xBC if
0bd(2b 2d 2) and xBNCxBC if bd(2b 2d 2)1in that xi ixi if 0
bd(2b 2d 2), andxi ixi if bd(2b 2d 2)1 (equity if bd(2b 2d 2)).
The first−order conditions for BNC and BNCJ are obtained from (10) as follows, respectively:
2b (2b 2d 2bd) a c (1)x  
(b d )(2b d )(4b 2d 2)  c I(x ) (10)′
2b (b d )(a c 4bx )
(b d ) (2b d )2  c I(x ). (10)′
Making a comparison of the left−hand sides of these equations yields
2b (2b 2d 2bd) a c (1)x  
(b d )(2b d )(4b 2d 2)  2b (b d )(a c 4bx )(b d ) (2b d )2 if 2b 2d 2bd 21.
It now follows that xBNCxBNCJ if (2b 2d 2)bd 21.
Similarly, the following first−order conditions for BC and BCJ are obtained from (11):
2b (b d )(1) a c (1)x  
(b d ) (2b d )2  c I(x ) (11)′
4b (b d )(a c 2x )
(b d ) (2b d )2  c I(x ). (11)′
Since the left−hand side of (11)′is obviously greater than that of (11)′, we have xBCxBCJ for any . This
result holds for the case with d 0 as well.
12 Poyago−Theotoky (1999) shows that each of two firms has an incentive to disclose its R&D knowledge to the partner when
spillover is considered to be as an exogenous, not endogenous, variable. This provides a theoretical foundation for why firms intend
to form an R&D cooperation.
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Interestingly, the relationship between xBCand xBCJ holds independent of spillover. As for the comparison
between the R&D investments in R&D and RJV competitions we note that, given d  0, R&D investment is
larger in R&D competition than in RJV competition for any spillover. On the other hand, given d 0, the range
offor which xBNC xBNCJ holds reduces as the product differentiation between them makes progress. In fact,
there is no such that the inequality holds as long as b (3 17 )d4, i.e., 0 d 2b 2 8(13 17 )≒
0467.
Since price pB is a decreasing function of R&D investment, we immediately can obtain from the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. (a) Given d 0, the prices, p k, kBNCBNCJBC, and BCJ, satisfy pBNC pBC if 0 bd(2b 2d 2) ; pBNC pBC if bd(2b 2d 2) 1（equity holding if bd(2b 2d 2)) ; and
pBNCpBNCJ if (2b 2d 2)bd 21, and pBC pBCJ.
(b) Given d  0, those prices satisfy pBNCpBC, pBNC pBNCJ, and pBC pBCJ.
This corollary is the counterpart of Corollary 1. From Corollaries 1 and 2 we point out that the classification
between the prices under R&D cartelization and R&D competition in Bertrand−price competition is similar to
that in Cournot−quantity competition, as suggested by Kamien et al. (1992), so their suggestion is verified13.
However, we state that there are some differences between our and their classifications on detail points.
Note that price under BCJ (BNCJ) is the lowest (highest) among the four modes, BNC, BNCJ, BC and BCJ,
if spillovers are large. We, moreover, find that the formation of an RJV has opposite effects on consumer’s
surplus by whether firms operate in either R&D competition or R&D cartelization.
The results obtained in Cournot quantity−setting and Bertrand price−setting models are almost the same, but
there still exists some difference between them. To put it concretely, the range ofsuch that xCNCxCC holds
is greater than the one such that xBNCxBC holds, while its range such that xCNC xCNCJ is smaller than the
one such that xBNC xBNCJ holds.
From the comparisons of the results in both the quantity−setting and price−setting models we see that both
classifications on output are hardly affected by whether the mode of competition in the product markets is a la
Cournot or a la Bertrand. We conclude that a difference in strategy in product markets does not have a great
effect on their R&D behavior.
As in Cournot−quantity competition, the existence of precommitment such as R&D investment and
advertising is beneficial to consumers if spillover effects are small, while it is detrimental if large. In the
presence of large spillover rates there also exists a strong incentive for firms to make either R&D investment or
advertising before the choice of quantity. This shows that they have a ground for making such precommitment.
13 Their suggestion is limited to the cases in which spillover rates are relatively large, so does not refer to all cases.
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4. Comparison of the Cournot−quantity and the Bertrand−price competition models
It is commonly recognized that output (price) is less (higher) in the quantity competition than in the price
competition. However, it seems that there are no papers which investigate whether or not this conventional
outcome is valid in the case where both R&D investment and its spillover exist. So let us investigate it. By
utilizing the results in Sections 2 and 3, we compare the market performances in both Cournot−quantity and
Bertrand−price competitions.
Thus we can conduct the comparison of the R&D investment revels in the Cournot quantity−setting and in the
Bertrand price−setting models as follows:
Proposition 3. (i) Suppose that two firms engage in R&D competition in the first stage. Then, (a) if d  0, the
equilibrium R&D investment is larger in Cournot−quantity competition than in Bertrand−price competition, i.e.,
xCNC xBNC; and (b) if d 0, the reverse result holds, i.e., xCNCxBNC. (ii) Suppose that they form an R&D
cartel in the first stage. Then, (a) if d  0, the equilibrium R&D investment is larger in Cournot−quantity
competition than in Bertrand−price competition, i.e., xCC xBC; and (b) if d 0, the reverse result holds, i.e.,
xCCxBC.
Proof. We can rewrite (5) and (10) in the Cournot−strategic and in the Bertrand−strategic games, respectively,
as follows:ixi  CNC 2b (2b d)4b 2d 2 qiCc I(xi ) 0 (12)ixi  BNC 2b (2b 2bdd 2)(b d ) (2b d )2 qiCc I(xi ) 0, (13)
where qi
C  (b d )(2b d )qBb (2b d ). The first terms on the right−hand sides of these equations stand
for the marginal revenues of R&D investment in Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price competitions. As for the
coefficients of qi
C of both terms we obtain
2b (2b d)
4b 2d 2  () 2b (2b 2bdd 2)(b d ) (2b d )2 for d  () 0.
This demonstrates that the marginal revenue of R&D investment is greater or less in Cournot−quantity
competition than in Bertrand−price competition according as d is positive or negative. It follows that
xCNC () xBNC as d  () 0.
Compare the R&D investments under the R&D cartels in both Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price
competitions. Rewriting (6) and (11) yields
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  xi  CC 2b (1)2b d qiCc I(xi ) 0 (14)  xi  BC 2b (2b d )(b d )(1)(b d ) (2b d )2 qiCc I(xi ) 0. (15)
As for the coefficients of qi
C in (14) and (15) the following results are derived:
2b (1)
2b d () 2b (2b d )(b d )(1)(b d ) (2b d )2 for d () 0,
so we get the result that x
CC() xBC as d () 0. The R&D investment in a quantity−setting model always
exceeds that in a price−setting model, independently of whether or not firms form an R&D cartel. The results of
Proposition 3 are valid for the RJVs as well.
Let us make a comparison of the outputs in the quantity−setting and price−setting models. Then we have the
following proposition:
Proposition 4. (a) Given d 0, the equilibrium output (price) can be greater (lower) in Cournot−quantity
competition than in Bertrand−price competition if xCk is relatively large enough in comparison with xBk:
qCkqBk and pCkpBk, k NCC. (b) Given d 0, the equilibrium output (price) is greater (lower) in
Bertrand−price competition than in Cournot−quantity competition: qCkqBk and pCkpBk.
Proof. Each of the outputs in the quantity−setting and price−setting models is given by qCk 
(a A Ck)(2b d ) and qBk b (a A Bk)(b d )(2b d ), where A ik c (1)x ik, i CB. Let us
take the case with d 0. Comparing both outputs yields
qCkqBk  1
(4b 2d 2)(b d ) ad 2b (2b d ) c (1)xCk (2b d )(b d )b (2b d ) c (1)xBkc (1)xCk  .
As shown in Proposition 3, when d is positive, xCkxBk, k NCC, so the term of the braces can be negative,
i.e. qCkqBk, if xCk is relatively large compared with xBk. Next take the case with d 0. In this case since
a A Cka A Bk as xCkxBk, k NCC , we obtain qCkqBk.
Furthermore, under the assumption of symmetry we have pBkpCk (b d )(qCkqBk) from the inverse
demand functions, where pCk  ab (b d )A Ck (2b d ) and pBk  a (b d )bA Bk (2b d ). Then
it follows from the results above that if d 0, then pCkpBk can hold for relatively large xCk compared with
xBk, while if d 0, then pCkpBk holds for any R&D investment.
To intuitively explain how Result (a) of the proposition holds, let us look at such as a case with d = 0.99b .
When comparing the outputs in Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price competitions without R&D investment,
we get q
CNCqBNC 0163(a c )b. This shows that the difference between them is not so large, rather
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small. Furthermore, when turning to the comparison of both outputs with R&D investment, we have
qCNC qBNC as long as xCNC 1489xBNC 0488(a c )(1 ). The latter inequality seems not too
implausible in view of the fact that, given d  0, xCNC xBNC, as shown in Proposition 3. The reason why the
conventional result may be invalid when the products are substitutes (d  0) and R&D investments are chosen
prior to quantity or price choices is that the effect of R&D investment on output is larger in Cournot competition
than in Bertrand one. It follows that in terms of consumer surplus and welfare the Cournot equilibrium may
dominate the Bertrand one in this case, but except for this case the former equilibrium unambiguously dominate
the latter one.
The proposition says that the market performance in strategic two−stage game models is the same as the
conventional one without strategic behavior.
When combining the results of Propositions 3 and 4, (10), and (22), we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3. (a) The R&D investments and outputs under CNC, CNCJ, BNC, and BNCJ satisfy
xBNCJxBNCxCNCJxCNC and qCNCJqCNCqBNCJqBNC.
(b) The R&D investments and outputs under CC, CCJ, BC, and BCJ satisfy
xBCxBCJxCCxCCJ and qCCqCCJqBCqBCJ.
This states that organization of an RJV under R&D cartelization leads to an increase in output as long as firms
engage in Bertrand−price competition, so output in RJV competition is the greatest among the four modes.
Meanwhile, the formation of an RJV in R&D competition in Cournot−quantity competition leads to a decrease
in output, and its output is the smallest among them. More interestingly, in price−setting models larger amounts
of output are yielded although the amounts of investment are smaller, regardless of whether firms behave
competitively in R&D or form an R&D cartel. That is, the efficiency of R&D investment is, in general, greater
in Bertrand−price competition than in Cournot−quantity competition.
Furthermore, the comparison on price among the RJV cases (CNCJ, CCJ, BNCJ, and BCJ) derives the
following corollary from Proposition 4, Corollaries 1 and 3, and other previous results:
Corollary 4. (a) The prices under R&D and RJV competitions in Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price
competitions satisfy pBNCpBNCJpCNCpCNDJ for all values of; and (b) the prices under R&D and RJV
cartelizations in Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price competitions satisfy pBCJpBCpCCJpCC for all
values of.
In the comparison of R&D and RJV competitions price under BNC is the lowest, and one under CNCJ is the
highest, so that consumer’s surplus is the greatest (lowest) under BNC (CNCJ). On the other hand, in the
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comparison of cartelization the lowest price is obtained under BCJ, and the highest price under CC, so the
surplus is maximized (minimized) in BCJ (CC). From the viewpoint of industrial policy, if output markets are in
price competition, then the government could lead to the lowest price by promoting the policy of creation of a
research joint venture (RJV). On the whole, the creation of the RJV will lead to low prices in comparison with
the case without such creation. This is, however, not the case in quantity competition.
The lower price is and the less R&D expenditure is, the more welfare increases. Then, taking use of
Propositions 3 and 4 into consideration, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 5.Welfare is greater in Bertrand−price competition than in Cournot−price competition, irrespective
of whether firms engage in R&D competition or form an R&D cartel in the first stage14.
This proposition holds for any spillover rate. The conventional outcome as to the comparison of welfare,
therefore, seems to be robust. The implication of the proposition is that it is beneficial to promote price
competition among firms even if they use advertising except for R&D as a strategic method.
It appears that the results obtained in this section are also maintained even if the number of firms is extended
from 2 to n .
5. Conclusion
We have considered the behavior of strategic R&D investment with its spillover under four organizational
modes (e.g., R&D competition, RJV competition, R&D cartelization, and RJV cartelization) in Cournot−
quantity and in Bertrand−price competitions and its effects on prices and outputs when assuming product
differentiation. Then the R&D investments in the four modes within each of Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−
price competitions are mutually compared. Furthermore, we make a comparison of the four market
performances between the two competitions.
We have derived the classifications with respect to R&D investment, output, and price not only in Cournot−
quantity competition but also in Bertrand−price one. With respect to the comparisons of the four R&D
investments under R&D competition, R&D cartelization, RJV competition, and RJV cartelization in the
quantity−setting model, the same outcomes as Kamien et al. (1992) are obtained. We point out that their
classifications in fact rely heavily on the assumption of symmetry, in other words, if there is no symmetry
assumption, the magnitudes of spillover rates, in which their outcomes are valid, are very restricted. On the
other hand, in the price−setting model, if products are complements, then the classifications of the four R&D
investments are the similar to those in the quantity−setting model. Concretely, given large spillovers (roughly
14 From the classifications above and Corollaries 3 and 4 we obtain the following results: xCNC xCNCJ xBNC xBNCJ and
pCNCJ pCNC pBNCJ pBNC, and xCCJ xCC xBCJ xBC and pCC pCCJ pBC pBCJ. Thus welfare is greater in BC and
BCJ than in CC and CCJ, but it is difficult to compare it between BC and BCJ, and CC and CCJ.
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speaking, great product differentiation), the formation of an RJV under R&D cartelization leads to the lowest
price among the four modes, while its formation under R&D competition, conversely, leads to the highest price.
Thus it follows that the formation of RJV under R&D cartelization causes consumer’s surplus to increase, and
its formation under R&D competition conversely causes it to decrease.
Secondly, we have taken a step forward and compared between the R&D investments and prices in both
Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price competitions. This gives an answer to a question of whether or not the
conventional conclusion that price is lower in the latter than in the former holds in strategic two−stage games as
well. When making a comparison between the prices (outputs), we obtain the result that prices (outputs) are
lower (greater) in Bertrand−price competition than in Cournot−quantity one. Consequently, we conclude that the
conventional conclusion is obviously robust, because it is kept unchanged not only even if such a strategic
variable as R&D investment and a spillover effect are introduced but also even if such a spillover effect changes.
More interestingly, output is greater in Bertand−price competition than in Cournot−quantity one although R&D
investment under R&D competition is less in the former than in the latter.
Thirdly, when comparing welfare in Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price competitions, we note that welfare
is greater in the former than in the latter. This implies that the conventional conclusion concerning welfare
comparison carries over to the case where firms have strategic commitment prior to output or price choice.
From the viewpoint of industrial policy, we may be able to provide some guideline with respect to the choice
of optimal R&D policy.
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Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Cournot and
Bertrand Duopolies with Spillovers, and Their Comparison
Shoji Haruna
We consider the choices of R&D investment, output, and price in Cournot−quantity and Bertrand−price
competitions by using strategic two−stage game models. When comparing the market performances in both
competitions, we see that although the amount of R&D investment is larger in Cournot−quantity than in
Bertrand−price one, the conventional outcome that output (price) is larger (higher) in the former competition
than in the latter one carries over to the strategic game model with R&D investment and spillover effects. It is
shown that strategic R&D behavior is beneficial to consumers when the spillover effect is small, and firms have
a strong incentive to make such commitment as R&D investment and advertising when they are large. Whether
in Counrot−quantity competition firms have an incentive to use more or less R&D investment depends on the
magnitude of spillover, while in Bertrand−price competition they always have an incentive to use less R&D
investment.
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